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Government Aid to Church-Related Education: An
Alternative Rationale
Church-related schools in the United States are in serious
economic trouble, and have been for a number of years.' Government attempts to alleviate the problem through aid programs
have often been challenged in the courts under the establishment
clause of the first amendment,2 and many of these challenges
have resulted in Supreme Court decision^.^ Unfortunately, the
reasoning behind these decisions is often difficult to understand
and even more difficult to defend. Because of the continuing flow
of aid-to-church-related-education cases being brought before the
court^,^ it is important that a consistent, defensible rationale be
developed to justify old precedents and cope with new problems
as they arise. This Comment will examine and criticize the Supreme Court's reasoning in the aid cases and then attempt to
sketch the outlines of a more satisfactory rationale."
1. For a discussion of the serious financial problems facing private institutions of
ON UNITEDMETHODIST
higher education in the United States, see NATIONAL
COMMISSION
HIGHEREDUCATION,
ENDANGERED
SERVICE
47-51 (1976). For a discussion of the financial
difficulties of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, see Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 815-20 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); New
York State Council of Catholic School Superintendents, Another Aspect of the Financial
Crisis in Education: The Current Problem of Support for the Education of Catholic Elementary and Secondary School Children, 16 CATH.LAW.15, 15-26 (1970) (analysis of the
financial problems of New York parochial schools).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." U.S.
CONST.amend. I.
3. See, e.g, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U S . 734 (1973);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. A large number of cases dealing with constitutional challenges to government
programs aiding church-related education have been decided in the federal district courts
during 1977 and 1978 alone. See, e.g., Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F.
Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228
(D.N.J. 1978); Filler v. Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp.
97 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977); Smith v. Board of Governors, 429 F. Supp.
871 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803 (1977).
5. The scope of this Comment, then, is limited to government aid programs that
impact on church-related schools. Although the principles that are developed may in
certain instances have broader applicability, no attempt will be made to generalize the
discussion to other areas of church-state relationships.
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman, "he Supreme Court distilled from
previous opinions three tests that have proven to be the doctrinal
starting point for determining the constitutionality of government enactments challenged under the establishment clause:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "'
The first two tests express the idea that the government
should not enact programs having either the purposeRor the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. This idea, which lies a t the
heart of establishment clause theory, will be referred to as the
value of n e ~ t r a l i t y The
. ~ third test has two branches. The first
branch suggests that excessive involvement of the state in religious activities, or administrative entanglement, is an evil to be
a ~ o i d e d . ~ V l ? hsecond
e
branch suggests that political divisions
along religious lines, or political entanglement, should also be
guarded against." These values, neutrality and the avoidance of
administrative and political entanglement, have been referred to
repeatedly by the Court. They constitute the theoretical foundation of establishment clause analysis.

Although the values underlying the establishment clause are
clear, their practical implications are often in doubt. This Section
will briefly outline the cases in which the Supreme Court has
attempted to apply these abstract values to practical problems
6. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7. Id. a t 612-13 (citations omitted).
8. No aid program has ever been invalidated on the grounds that it lacked a secular
legislative purpose. This is probably due to the Court's reluctance to question legislative
motives. See Note, Establishment Clause Anulysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid
L. REV.1175, 1179-80 (1974).
to Religion, 74 COLUM.
9. The value of neutrality has been discussed with approval in a number of Supreme
Court opinions. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 744, 747-48 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,668-70 (1970); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
10. The Court has spoken out against the evils of administrative entanglement in
several cases. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1971).
11. The value of avoiding political entanglement has been discussed with approval
in several opinions. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
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involving government aid to church-related education. The rationale relied upon in these cases will be examined and criticized.
Since the Court has taken a significantly different view of aid
involving sectarian elementary and secondary schools (parochial
schools) as opposed to sectarian colleges, these will be considered
separately.
A. Aid to Parochial Education
The first important case involving aid to parochial education
was Everson v. Board of Education.12In Everson, the Court asserted that the establishment clause meant that neither a state
nor the federal government "can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or perfer one religion over another. . . . No Tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions."13 In spite of this absolute "no
aid" rhetoric, the Everson Court upheld a state program providing busfare refunds to the parents of students attending both
public and parochial schools. The Court reasoned that the state
was merely extending the benefits of general welfare legislation
to all citizens without regard to their religious beliefs." In his
dissent, Justice Rutledge argued that in reality the majority opinion permitted the government to do what was expressly forbidden; that is, to support religious institutions. He contended that
subsidizing busfares, an essential element of the costs of parochial education, constituted as a practical matter aid to religion.l5
After Everson, the next important case involving aid to parochial education was Board of Education v. Allen,l+here the
Supreme Court upheld a state program providing secular textbook loans to students attending both public and private (including parochial) schools. In making its decision, the Court recognized that parochial schools have dual functions, secular and
sectarian. It intimated that aid to the sectarian function was
impermissible. However, the Court was unwilling to agree with
the parties challenging the program that either "all teaching in a
sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and
religious training are so intertwined that secular textbooks fur12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

330 U.S. l (1947).
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 44-49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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nished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the
teaching of religion."17
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, la the Court used a two-step approach
to disallow state programs providing salary subsidies to teachers
of secular subjects in parochial schools. First, the Court held that
the establishment clause prohibits a teacher receiving government salary subsidies from inculcating religion.lg Second, the
Court found that the government inspections required in order to
ensure compliance with the constitutional rule would create excessive administrative entanglement.20The Court also observed
that there were substantial dangers of political entanglement inherent in these programs. "The potential for political divisiveness
related to religious belief and practice" was aggravated in these
programs "by the need for continuing annual appropriations and
the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty u.
Nyquist,22the Court disallowed a program that provided state
subsidies for the maintenance and repair of parochial school facilities. The Court reasoned that these facilities would be used, a t
.~~
this same case, tuition
least in part, for sectarian p ~ r p o s e s In
refunds and tax benefits for the parents of parochial schoolchildren were disallowed on the ground that there were no restrictions
guaranteeing that the government money would be used only for
secular purposes .24
17. Id. at 245-48. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have upheld other textbook programs similar to the one upheld in Allen. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-38
(1977) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,359-62 (1975) (plurality opinion). However, the Court has repudiated a significant element of the Allen rationale. See
notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra.
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Cf. Americans United for Separation of Church & State v.
Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972) (program providing public teachers and educational
materials for the teaching of secular subjects in parochial schools held unconstitutional);
Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970) (program whereby state
"purchased" secular instruction from parochial schools disallowed), aff'd, 403 U.S. 955
(1971).
19. 403 U.S. at 619.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 622-24.
22. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
23. Id. at 774-80.
24. Id. at 780-94. The Court was unimpressed by the fact that since parents receiving
tuition reimbursements were free to spend the money in any manner they chose, there was
no assurance that actual government dollars would end up in the hands of the parochial
schools. Neither was the Court impressed by the fact that the parents participating in the
tax benefit program received no actual cash payments; the state merely refrained from
collecting a certain portion of their taxes. The Court held, rather, that "neither form of

-
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By the time Nyquist was decided, a recurrent theme had
developed in Supreme Court opinions which will be denominated
the "no direct aid rule."25 The Court, recognizing that churchrelated education has two aspects, secular and sectarian, disallowed aid to sectarian activities but permitted aid to secular activities?The Court intimated that under circumstances where
separation of secular and sectarian activities was impossiblez7or
unenforceable without the creation of excessive administrative
entanglement," no aid whatsoever was permissible. The establishment clause was held violated if even one penny of government money went to support religion. On the other hand, the
Court permitted secular activities to be funded to the extent they
could be isolated, even if this aid had the effect of freeing other
funds to be used for sectarian purpose^.^
Subsequent cases have followed the no direct aid rule. Government programs providing parochial school students with
standardized testing and scoring services were upheld on the
grounds that they constituted aid to secular activities only." The
aid is sufficiently restricted to assure that i t will not have the impermissible effect of
advancing the sectarian activities of religious schools." Id. a t 794.
Tuition reimbursement or tax benefit programs similar to those challenged in Nyquist
have generally been disallowed by the district courts. Public Funds for Pub. Schools v.
Byrne, 444 F. Supp. 1228 (D.N.J. 1978); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio
1972), aff'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp.
399 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 409 U.S. 808 (1972). The United States District Court for Minnesota, however, recently upheld a state enactment allowing the parents of all children
attending both public and private (including parochial) schools to deduct from their
personal income for purposes of computing state income tax an amount corresponding to
their expenses for tuition, transportation, and secular textbooks. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). This program may be distinguishable from those disallowed in prior cases in that it benefited parents of children
attending both public and private schools.
25. The term "no direct aid rule" has never been employed by the Court; it is a n
invention of the author. The Court expressed a similar thought when it stated that direct
aid to religious activities is impermissible, while enactments that have "an indirect and
incidental effect beneficial to religious institutions" are permissible. Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-75
(1973).
27. E.g.,Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,755 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1971) (plurality opinion).
28. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-19 (1971).
29. "Stated another way, the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all
aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973).
30. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1977) (plurality opinion). But cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(government reimbursement of expenses allocable to compliance with state-mandated
attendance reporting and administration of state-prepared examinations a t parochial
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provision of speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services on parochial school premises by school board employees and
physicians working under government contracts was also upheld.31 The Court reasoned that the nature of these activities
minimized the danger of religious-inculcation by those performing the services and hence the necessity of entangling inspect i o n ~A. ~program
~
furnishing parochial schoolchildren with therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services a t locations apart from
parochial school premises was upheld because no entangling interaction between public and parochial school officials was required to ensure secular content.33On the other hand, administrative entanglement dangers were held sufficient to disallow provision by public employees of remedial and accelerated instruction,
guidance counseling and testing, and speech and hearing therapeutic (as opposed to diagnostic) services when conducted on
parochial school premises.34Also struck down were statutes providing public funds for the preparation of examinations by parochial schoolteacher^^^ and government-funded busing for field
trips.36The Court reasoned that the implementation of measures
sufficient to ensure that no religion seeped into the preparation
of the examinations or the teaching associated with the field trips
would entail excessive administrative entanglement.
schools held unconstitutional by district court), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902
(1977).
31. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). Accord, Filler v. Port Wash. Union Free
School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
32. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1977).
33. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1977). Accord, Filler v. Port Wash.
Union Free School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The Wolman Court also
noted the following:
The fact that a unit on a neutral site on occasion may serve only sectarian
pupils does not provoke the same concerns that troubled the Court in Meek. [In
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-71 (1975), the Court disallowed a program
providing similar services on parochial school premises.] The influence on the
therapist's behavior that is exerted by the fact that he serves a sectarian pupil
is qualitatively different from the influence of the pervasive atmosphere of a
religious institution.
433 U.S. a t 247 (footnote omitted).
34. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975). The Court also noted that these
programs created a serious potential for political entanglement. Id. a t 372.
35. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). Cf.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (government reimbursement of expenses allocable to compliance with statemandated attendance reporting and administration of state-prepared examinations a t
parochial schools held unconstitutional by district court), vacated and remanded, 433
U . S . 902 (1977).
36. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252-55 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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Although the no direct aid rule has been consistently upheld,
subsequent cases have diverged from the Allen-Lemon-Nyquist
rationale in one respect. In Meek u. Pittenger,37the Court disallowed a program that provided loans of instructional materials
such as maps, charts, and laboratory equipment to parochial
schools. The Court was not convinced by the argument that these
materials, like secular textbooks, are incapable of diversion to
religious uses and are hence self-policing-no entangling inspections are required to guarantee that they will not be used to
inculcate religion. Rather, the Court concluded that parochial
schools are so pervasively sectarian that secular and sectarian
activities cannot be separated; hence, any direct subsidy impermissibly aids religion.3RThis determination is disturbing because
it directly contradicts a premise that was apparently essential to
the Court's ruling in Allen and was not questioned in either
Lemon or Nyquist. 38

B. R-ograms Aiding Church-Related Higher Education
Substantially more government aid has been allowed to flow
to church-related colleges than to parochial school^,^ largely because of the Court's determination that church-related colleges
are generally less sectarian than parochial schools." The Court
has found that major portions of the curriculum a t most churchrelated colleges can be labeled secular and are hence eligible for
government subsidies." Furthermore, it has been accepted that
37. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
38. Id. a t 362-66. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977); Public
Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29,36-39 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd, 417 U.S.
961 (1974).
39. The Court in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 n.18 (1977), recognized this
inconsistency between Allen and Meek and accepted the Meek rationale, refusing to
overrule Allen only as a matter of stare decisis. See generally Survey-A Survey of Selected Contemporary Church-State Boblems, 51 NOTRE
DAMELAW. 737, 759-69 (1976).
40. The Supreme Court cases dealing with government aid to church-related colleges
are Roemer'v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (noncategorical grants to churchrelated colleges approved where statute prohibited sectarian use of funds and none of the
aided institutions were so pervasively sectarian that secular and sectarian aspects could
not be separated); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (participation of church-related
colleges not found to be pervasively sectarian in program whereby the state issued revenue
bonds to assist in the construction of facilities to be used for secular purposes upheld);
and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (participation of church-related colleges not
found to be pervasively sectarian in federal program providing grants for the construction
of academic facilities to be used for secular purposes upheld).
41. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality opinion).
42. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-61 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-82 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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the highly secular atmosphere a t most church-related colleges
lessens the dangers of administrative entanglement." Since the
chances of religion contaminating subsidized portions of the curriculum would be slight, the requisite inspections by government
officials to ensure that no government money goes to sectarian
activities could be "quick and n~njudgmental."~~
This generally favorable prognosis for programs aiding
church-related colleges must be qualified in one respect. The no
direct aid rule mandates that no aid whatsoever can flow to institutions in which religion is so pervasive that it is impossible to
separate the secular and the sectarian aspects.45Nevertheless,
some lower courts have permitted students attending certain pervasively sectarian institutions to share in the benefits of government assistance programs available to both public and private
college students.46
43. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761-67 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U S . 734, 745-46 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U S . 672, 684-88
(1971) (plurality opinion). The Tilton Court also noted that the potential for political
divisiveness is less with colleges and universities then with elementary and secondary
schools. Id. a t 688-89.
44. The phrase is used in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U S . 736, 764 (1976).
45. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
46. See Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 433 F.
Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.) (financial assistance program available to resident students attending accredited Tennessee public and nonpublic colleges upheld; among the participating institutions were sectarian and pervasively sectarian colleges), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803
(1977); Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972) (state program authorizing establishment of educational assistance authority to make and guarantee loans to
college students attending the public or private institution of their choice upheld; sectarian colleges and probably some pervasively sectarian colleges were allowed to participate),
appeal dismissed, 413 U.S. 902 (1973). Cf. Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp.
597 (D.S.C. 1974) (provision of V.A. benefits to students attending a pervasively sectarian
college held not violative of the establishment clause, but disallowed because of racially
discriminatory policies of the college), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975); Americans
United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.) (tuition grants to students attending public and
approved private colleges upheld; sectarian colleges were allowed to participate, but unclear whether any pervasively sectarian colleges were allowed participation), cert. denied,
429 U S . 1029 (1976). But cf. Lendall v. Cook, 432 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (scholarship program available to public and private college students upheld; sectarian colleges
were allowed participation, but the court apparently would have disallowed participation
by pervasively sectarian colleges had there been any receiving benefits); Smith v. Board
of Governors, 429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C.) (scholarship programs available to private
college students upheld; sectarian colleges allowed participation, but the court apparently
would have disallowed participation of pervasively sectarian colleges had there been any
receiving benefits), aff'd, 434 U S . 803 (1977); Americans United for the Separation of
Church & State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (tuition grant program
allowing for the participation of church-related colleges disallowed; case remanded by the
Supreme Court because of changes made in the administration of the program), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Blanton v. Americans United for the Separation of Church &
State, 421 U S . 958 (1975); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb,
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C. The Need for a Different Rationale
The Supreme Court's school aid decisions are subject to criticism in at least two respects. First, as has already been mentioned, there is an inconsistency between Board of Education u.
A llen4' and more recent opinions: the Allen decision assumed that
religion is not so pervasive in parochial schools that secular and
sectarian aspects cannot be separated, while recent decisions
have assumed just the opposite.48This criticism is minor in the
sense that it does not directly bring into question the validity of
the Court's rationale; it merely suggests that either Allen or the
more recent cases were based on an incorrect factual determination.
The second criticism is more significant: there appears to be
a fundamental conflict between the value of neutrality and the
results of the cases. The Court continues to pay homage to neutrality while approving programs that appear to provide aid to
religion.'"ndeed, most if not all of the programs that have been
379 F. Supp. 872 (D. Kan. 1974) (students attending pervasively sectarian colleges not
allowed to participate in state tuition grant program aiding students attending independent colleges; students attending other church-related colleges allowed to participate).
47. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
48. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
49. The classic formulation of this criticism was rendered by Mr. Justice Jackson in
his dissent to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion
yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. The case which
irresistably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'r consent,'-consented."
See also id. a t 28-74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973),disallowed a Mississippi statutory program under which textbooks were loaned free of charge to students
attending public and private schools without regard to whether participating private
schools had racially discriminatory policies. The Court reasoned as follows:
Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form
of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools themselves.
An inescapable educational cost for students in both public and private schools
is the expense of providing all necessary learning materials. When, as here, that
necessary expense is borne by the State, the economic consequence is to give
aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discriminatory practices the State
by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support to such discrimination. Racial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and "[ilt is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or
promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to
accomplish." Lee u. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458,475476 (MD Ala. 1967).
Id. at 463-65 (footnote omitted). It is difficult to explain why this same kind of reasoning
should not be employed to disallow as a violation of the principle of neutrality the provision of secular textbooks to students attending parochial schools.
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approved provide financial aid to religion in the sense that they
channel government money to sectarian institutions either directly or indirectly through students and parents. The fact that
government assistance is restricted to the secular aspects of
church-related education does not,' as a practical matter, keep it
from furthering religion. The sectarian school, in the words of
Justice Douglas, is "an organism living on one budget."50 Aid to
a part, be it classified as secular or sectarian, necessarily aids the
whole. The Supreme Court's rationale is unsatisfactory, then,
because it leaves unresolved the paradox of simultaneous Court
approval of the value of neutrality, which would appear to disallow all aid, and programs which in fact appear to provide aid.
Recent Supreme Court decisions signal a growing dissatisfaction with the current rationale. None of the three latest cases
dealing with government aid to church-related education,
Wolman u. Walter,51Roemer v. Board of Public Works,52and
Meek u. Pittenger," was able to command a majority opinion
throughout. Altogether, fifteen separate opinions were filed in
these three cases. It would apear, then, that this area of the law
stands in need of a more uniformly acceptable rationale.

In attempting to sketch the outlines of a more satisfactory
rationale, it is appropriate to begin with the values that underlie
the establishment clause. The implications of the values of neutrality and the avoidance of administrative and political entanglement will be discussed in the context of government programs
aiding education. Then, consideration will focus on the relevance
of five factors the Court has identified as bearing upon the judicial determination of whether these values are vindicated.

A.

Values Underlying the Establishment Clause

1. Neutrality

In the context of aid to education, government programs can
advance or inhibit religion in two different ways. First, the government may enact programs that have the effect of either helping or hindering sectarian schools. Second, the government may
50.
51.
52.
53.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
433 U.S. 229 (1977).
426 U.S. 736 (1976).
421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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deal with sectarian schools in such a way as to give the impression
of either official sponsorship or disapproval of religion. The value
of neutrality suggests that government actions should neither
help nor hinder sectarian schools and should neither sponsor nor
manifest official disapproval of religion. For the purposes of this
Comment, these two principles will be called, respectively, educational neutrality and sponsorships4neutrality.
a. Educational neutrality. In considering the principle of
'educational neutrality, it is instructive to examine the effects on
sectarian education of programs that aid public schools alone and
also of programs that aid both public and sectarian schools.
These effects will vary according to the nature of the sectarian
institutions. For example, consider a highly sectarian school
sponsored by a church that holds attendance a t this school to be
a religious r e q ~ i r e m e n tExclusion
.~~
from a program subsidizing
public education would probably have little impact on this
school. Since attendance is essentially an act of faith, and substantially all of the students who attend are believers or the children of believers, there would no mass student exodus should
facilities and services lag behind those available at corresponding
public institutions. Moreover, if this school were permitted to
share in the benefits of programs aiding public education, attendance might increase greatly as a larger number of believers find
it within their financial capabilities to attend or send their children.
On the other hand, the effects of government aid programs
on a mildly sectarian school would be very different. For example,
consider a church-related college a t which the inculcation and
practice of religion is only a minor aspect. Although many of the
students enjoy and take advantage of the limited sectarian activities available, their main purpose in attending is to obtain what
the school principally provides-secular education." If this institution is allowed full participation in government programs subsidizing corresponding public schools, the level of enrollment may
increase, but probably only to the degree that enrollment a t corresponding public colleges increases. On the other hand, if this
54. The Supreme Court on several occasions has held that sponsorship of religion is
one of the evils the establishment clause was designed to prevent. E.g., Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (plurality opinion); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973);Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U S . 664,668 (1970).
55. This seems to be a fairly accurate representation of the typical parochial school.
See notes 86-89 and accompanying text infra.
56. This seems to correspond with the Supreme Court's description of the prototype
sectarian college. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
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school is denied participation in government aid programs, a dramatic reduction in enrollment could result. Since the students
who typically consider attending this college are mainly concerned with secular education, they are unlikely to be willing to
forego the benefits of improved services and facilities or the lower
costs available at comparable government institutions in order to
enjoy the limited sectarian aspects present at this school. If government funding of public colleges continues to increase, the
school a t some point will probably be forced to close or drastically
reduce the scope of its operation^.^'
These considerations lead one to question the facile assumption that permitting church-related schools to participate in government educational subsidies always has the effect of advancing
sectarian education. Indeed, this premise may be strictly true
only in.the case of the most highly sectarian schools. Rather, it
would appear that a certain amount of aid to church-related
schools is justifiable in order to allow them to maintain their
economic stability in the face of ever-increasing government
funding of competing public schools.
Educational neutrality, then, should not be equated with
disallowance of all programs that have the effect of channeling
government money into church-related education. Instead, this
Comment offers the following proposal which constitutes the crux
of an alternative rationale: Government programs subsidizing
education should be termed educationally neutral if no change in
the success or failure of church-related schools can be traced to
their enactment. Under the principle of educational neutrality,
the government would be permitted (not requireds8)to allow for
the participation of sectarian schools in general" educational aid
57. See generally Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb, 379
F. Supp. 872, 877 (D. Kan. 1974).
Mildly sectarian colleges of this type are important to religious institutions in at least
two respects. First, even though the sectarian influence manifest at these schools may be
slight, it is nevertheless important in that it may constitute the only religious exposure
that many of the attending students are willing to accept. Second, the very existence of
church-related colleges tends to enhance the prestige, social acceptability, and intellectual
credibility of religion. The widespread failure of these institutions (which probably comprise the majority of the sectarian colleges in the United States) would constitute a major
loss to religion.
58. In recognition of the legislatures' wide discretion in allocating the benefits of
public welfare legislation, it would probably be unwise to require state subsidies of sectarian schools.
59. It might be wise to require that all programs rendering subsidies to sectarian
schools also be made available to corresponding nonsectarian private schools. If only
sectarian private schools are subsidized, aid programs may be interpreted as governmental
sponsorship of religion.
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programs to the extent necessary to maintain their current sta~US.~O

This principle is susceptible to a mechanical application.
The courts might logically determine that the best objective measure of the success or failure of sectarian schools is the level of
enrollment." Then, whenever an aid program was challenged
under the establishment clause, the courts would determine, with
the help of expert testimony, whether the net effect of the program would be to increase enrollment at sectarian schools. If so,
the program would be held violative of the establishment clause;
if not, the program would be upheld as within the principle of
educational neutrality.
This mechanical-application of the principle of educational
neutrality is undesirable, however, because it would likely lead to
the partial participation of sectarian schools in a large number of
educational programs, creating substantial problems of administration. From the standpoint of administrative efficiency and certainty in the law, it would be preferable to allow for the full
participation of sectarian schools in limited classes of general
educational subsidies. The more vulnerable the institution to increasing governmental expenditures for public education, the
larger the class of subsidies in which it should be allowed to
participate.
This concept of educational neutrality is useful because it
provides a rationale for limited government subsidization of
church-related education. It resolves the paradox of simultaneous
Court adherence to the principle of neutrality and approval of
programs that in fact channel aid to sectarian schools. More importantly, this concept provides a general framework within
which specific decisions can be made. It would probably not be
wise for courts to make specific judgments concerning the effects
of government aid on individual sectarian schools.62It would,
60. The principle of educational neutrality is in harmony with the ideas of Professor
Giannella, who "sanction[s] the propriety of governmental support-of religious institutions to the extent necessary to counterbalance the negative influences which the state's
increased societal role has on religion." Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment, Binciple, 81 HAW. L. REV.
513, 587 (1968).
61. Of course, the success or failure of church-related schools can be defined on the
basis of a number of factors. The regard with which these schools are held in the community, the degree of sectarianism they manifest, and the quality of secular education
they provide may all be important factors in measuring their success or failure and their
contribution to religion. However, the number of students who are enrolled is possibly the
most important factor, and undoubtedly it is the most easily measured.
62. The making of individual determinations might lead to excessive litigation. This
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however, be acceptable for courts to make general determinations
regarding the relative vulnerability of different classes of sectarian schools to increasing government spending for public education and consequently their eligibility for participation in government aid programs. The principle of educational neutrality establishes the broad outline of this alternative rationale; considerations that will be discussed subsequently are available to fill in
the details.
b. Sponsorship neutrality. Whenever the state places or
appears to place its imprimatur on one church or on religion
generally, it has impermissibly aided religion in violation of the
principle of sponsorship neutrality." Even though a program aiding church-related education may perfectly conform with the
principle of educational neutrality, it may be objectionable if the
form the aid takes gives the impression that the state is wielding
its power, influence, or financial support in favor of a particular
church or religion in general.64
But, while sponsorship neutrality has rightfully been given
great emphasis in deciding some establishment clause cases," its
importance in the area of government aid to church-related education should not be overstated. Unless sectarian education is
given special preference in the administration of government aid,
it is unlikely the public will get the impression that state policy
is proreligion. Indeed, the complete denial of aid might constitute
in the eyes of many a manifestation of hostility toward religion?"
Sponsorship neutrality could be called upon, however, to invaliis especially undesirable in the area of church-related education, because litigation requires sectarian schools to submit to extensive discovery proceedings and public scrutiny
of their internal affairs, raising the spectre of administrative entanglement. Furthermore,
the public discussion incident to major litigation of this kind may tend to create political
entanglement.
63. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430-32 (1962).
64. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1962).
65. Although the term "sponsorship neutrality" has not been employed by the Court,
certain practices have been disallowed because they were found to have the impermissible
effect of placing the power and influence of the state behind religious practices. E.g.,
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (daily Bible reading and prayer recitation
in public schools disallowed); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (daily recital of statecomposed prayer in public schools held unconstitutional).
66. The Court has held that it is impermissible for the state to manifest hostility
toward religion. In the words of Justice Clark, "We agree of course that the State may
not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing
hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe.' " School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).

6171

CHURCH-RELATED EDUCATION

631

date programs that give specific assistance to highly sectarian
functions.
2. Entanglement

If government programs neither injure nor assist religion,
they comply with the value of neutrality. If they create undesirable governmental incursions into the realm of religion, or undue
involvement of religion in the political process, however, they
may be objectionable because of administrative or political entanglement.
a. Administrative entanglement. Administrative entanglement occurs when, in the words of Chief Justice Burger, there is
"active involvement of the sovereign in religious a c t i ~ i t y . "In
~~
this complex society there are innumerable contacts between
church and state. It is clear that government enactments such as
"fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws," which
impinge directly or indirectly upon sectarian activities, are
unobjectionable? Similarly, there should be no constitutional
objection to government and church officials consulting together
regarding issues of common concern. Administrative entanglement problems of constitutional dimensions generally arise only
when the government begins to regulate those aspects of sectarian
institutions having ideological and particularly religious content.
It should not be offensive to constitutional values for the government to exercise some control over the nonideological service aspects of church-related education, such as transportation, health
care, and food services. The government typically regulates such
activities to some degree regardless of who performs them. Serious administrative entanglement problems may follow, however,
should the government begin to regulate what goes on the classroom.
There is a close correlation between the dangers of sponsorship and administrative entanglement. As government control
over sectarian activity increases, so does the danger of administrative entanglement, and so also does the appearance of government sponsorship.
b. Political entanglement. Political entanglement can be
viewed as the involvement of religion in political activity, or the
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
68. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).

632

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

creation of political divisions along religious lines." Certainly political entanglement is an ill to be avoided. The religious persecutions that mar English and colonial American history testify of
the evils of excessive involvement of religion in political affairs.'O
The threat of political entanglement should not be given
undue emphasis, however. The dangers of serious political divisions along religious lines at the present time would appear to be
quite remote." Recent experience has shown that the issue of
government aid to church-related education can be discussed
with remarkable moderation and tolerance on both sides.72

B. Factors Bearing Upon
Establishment Clause Analysis
In deciding establishment clause cases dealing with government programs aiding church-related education, the Supreme
Court has placed varying degrees of emphasis on a t least five
different factors: whether aid is limited to secular aspects,
whether aid is channeled to parents and students rather than to
schools, whether aid is administered as a one-shot enactment
rather than a program requiring periodic reexamination, the
breadth of the class of beneficiaries, and the degree of sectarianism manifest at aided institutions. The relevance of these factors
will be considered in the light of the values of neutrality and the
avoidance of administrative and political entanglement.
1. Aid to secular aspects versus sectarian aspects

The Supreme Court has purported to disallow all aid that
flows to the sectarian aspects of church-related ed~cation.'~
This
construction of the establishment clause creates enormous practical problems, since it requires the strict separation of churchrelated education into secular and sectarian parts. Not only is a
strict separation very likely impossible, since all of the parts of a
69. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
70. See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
71. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part); Lewin, Disentangling Myth from
Reality, 3 J.L. & EDUC.107, 110-12 (1974). But cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (Justice Brennan would have disallowed
all the challenged aid programs on political entanglement grounds); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 373-83 (1975) (Brennan J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Justice
Brennan would have disallowed the challenged textbook loan program on the grounds of
political entanglement).
72. Lewin, supra note 71, a t 111.
73. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra.
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school inevitably tend to partake of the character of the whole,"
but attempts to enforce such a separation often have the potential
of creating serious entanglement?
According to the principle of educational neutrality, some
aid to church-related education is justifiable and even desirable.
Since aid to secular activities frees funds that can be used to
promote sectarian activities, it makes little difference as a matter
of practical economics that aid is restricted to secular aspects.
Indeed, it could be argued that secular use restrictions produce
little more than changes in internal accounting procedure^^^ and
increased governmental interference and should, therefore, be
avoided. Two considerations militate against this conclusion.
First, if the government directly aids specifically sectarian activities there is danger that the public will view this as sponsorship
of religion. Second, a judicious application of secular use restrictions can have the effect of keeping direct aid and, with it, government regulation away from the sensitive, highly sectarian elements of church-related education, thus minimizing rather than
aggravating administrative entanglement.
Under the alternative rationale, then, this factor- whether
aid goes to secular or sectarian aspects-would retain some importance. However, the Court's present paranoiac fear of allowing
one penny of government money to aid sectarian activities would
be exchanged for a more rational sensitivity to actual dangers of
sponsorship and entanglement.
2. Aid to parents and students versus aid to schools

The Supreme Court has generally appeared to be willing to
approve programs aiding sectarian schools indirectly through
parents and students more readily than programs providing direct aid." As a matter of practical economics, this factor is relatively unimportant. By adjusting tuition rates, sectarian schools
-

-

-

-

74. The difficulty of separating secular from sectarian aspects is heightened by the
lack of consensus as to the appropriate constitutional definition of religion. See generally
Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL.U.L.
REV. 163 (1977); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HAW. L. REV.
1056 (1978).
75. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614-22 (1971).
76. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968), Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U S . 1, 18 (1947). In approving the programs challenged in both Allen and
Euerson, the Court noted that no government aid went to parochial schools; rather, it went
to parents or students.
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can absorb any aid the government provides to students or parents. This factor, however, is important in two other respects.
First, channeling aid to parents and students instead of to schools
serves as a practical shield against administrative entanglement.
When aid is administered in this form, sectarian schools remain
one step removed from direct contact with the government. Although there is no guarantee that the government will refrain
entirely from meddling,7Rthe chances are that interference, regulation, and hence administrative entanglement will be lessened."
Second, the dangers of sponsorship are reduced if aid is directed
to parents and students rather than to schools. The less direct the
contact between government and sectarian institutions, the less
the government aid will constitute an official sanction of religion
in the eyes of the public. Therefore, even though aid to churchrelated education may fall well within the principle of economic
neutrality, it is better if government money is laundered before
reaching sectarian schools by passing through a student or parent
filter.
3. One-shot enactments versus programs requiring periodic
reexaminations0

A certain degree of political divisiveness is engendered whenever legislative bodies consider programs that aid church-related
education. The less often aid programs come before the legislature, the less the threat of political divisions along religious lines.
Therefore, one-shot enactments should generally be preferred
over programs that will likely come before the legislature periodically for review and revi~ion.~'
Since the danger of the development of serious political divisions along religious lines seems
slight at the present time,RZ
this factor should not be given undue
emphasis under the alternative rationale.
78. Unfortunately, federal agencies have been known to rely upon the fact that some
students attending private schools receive federal benefits to assert broad regulatory powe n over the internal affairs of these institutions. See Comment, HEW$ Regulation Under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 133. Generally speaking, however, it would seem that government regulation of
sectarian schools would be less likely if aid were channeled to students or parents rather
than schools.
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403'U.S. 602, 621 (1973).
80. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of this factor in several opinions.
E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-98
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
81. In addition, to the extent they limit ongoing financial relationships and dependencies, one-shot enactments tend to engender less administrative entanglement than
other aid programs. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,688 (1971) (plurality opinion).
82. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.
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4. Breadth of the class of beneficiaries

The Supreme Court has suggested that the breadth of the
class of beneficiaries is relevant in detemining the constitutionality of government programs aiding church-related e d u ~ a t i o n . ~ ~
A general program benefiting both public and private education
may be held constitutional, while the identical program may be
disallowed if it benefits only sectarian education.
This factor is certainly relevant under the alternative rationale since the justification for allowing aid is to neutralize the
effects of increasing government expenditures for public education. The principle of educational neutrality, which permits sectarian schools to participate in the benefits of government programs aiding public education to the degree necessary to maintain their current status, requires that there be a corresponding
program benefiting public education for every program aiding
sectarian education.
The types of programs most clearly falling within the principle of educational neutrality are general educational subsidies
providing identical kinds of benefits to both public and private
schools. Certain departures from this ideal should probably be
permitted. For example, administrative considerations or entanglement concerns may dictate that aid to sectarian schools take
a slightly different form than aid to corresponding public schools.
The principle of sponsorship neutrality, however, suggests that
radical differences be avoided because they give the impression
of preferential treatment." Also, to require that every program
benefiting sectarian education be enacted concurrently with a
similar program aiding public schools would constitute an unnecessarily severe limitation on legislative prerogatives. Legislators
should have the option of neutralizing in a single program the
effects of a series of enactments aiding public schools. However,
there should be some limitation placed on the power of legislators
83. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782
n.38 (1973).
84. At least three district court decisions have disallowed aid programs that appeared
to give preferential treatment to parochial schools. Members of Jamestown School Comm.
v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 1338 (D.R.I. 1977) (interdistrict busing of parochial schoolchildren held unconstitutional where similar option not afforded to public students); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Iowa
1975) (interdistrict busing of parochial schoolchildren disallowed where similar option not
afforded to public students); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp.
29, 34-36 (D.N.J. 1973) (reimbursements to parents of parochial students for the costs of
purchasing secular textbooks disallowed where the state merely loaned textbooks to public
schoolchildren), aff'd, 417 U.S. 961 (1974).
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to promulgate aid programs for the purpose of neutralizng the
effects of past enactments benefiting only public schools. This
kind of legislation smacks of sponsorship, and in any event, the
effects of past legislative enactments on present-day sectarian
schools are very difficult to measure.
5. Degree of sectarianism manifest at aided institutionss

This factor is important under the alternative rationale because it serves as an indicator of the relative vulnerability of
different sectarian schools to increasing government expenditures
for public education, and hence their eligibility for government
aid according to the principle of educational neutrality. Generally
speaking, the more sectarian the institution, the less it will be
affected by government actions relating to public education. This
factor is also relevant in weighing entanglement and sponsorship
dangers: the more sectarian the institution, the more serious the
dangers of sponsorship and entanglement.

IV. APPLICATION
OF THE ALTERNATIVE
RATIONALE
Having set forth the theoretical outlines of an alternative
rational for aid-to-education cases, this Comment now turns to
the difficult problem of practical application. The implications of
the alternative rationale in the contexts of aid to parochial education and aid to sectarian colleges will be considered.

A. Aid to Parochial Education
The Supreme Court has described CatholicR6parochial
schools in these terms:
The church schools involved in the program are located
close to parish churches. This understandably permits convenient access for religious exercises since instruction in faith and
morals is part of the total educational process. The school buildings contain identifying religious symbols such as crosses on the
85. The degree of sectarianism manifest at aided institutions has been an important
factor in most of the Supreme Court decisions dealing with govenment aid to churchrelated education. See, e.g, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363-66 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-89 (1971)
(plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-19 (1971).
86. In 1975, over 80%of the students attending nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools attended Catholic parochial schools. Doem, The Enduring Controversy: Parochiaid and the Law, 9 VAL.U.L. REV.513, 522 (1975). Therefore, it is appropriate to view
programs benefiting nonpublic elementary and secondary schools essentially as programs
aiding Catholic parochial schools.
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exterior and crucifixes, and religious paintings and statues either in the classroom or hallways. Although only approximately
30 minutes a day are devoted to direct religious instruction,
there are religiously oriented extracurricular activities. Approximately two-thirds of the teachers in these schools are nuns of
various religious orders. Their dedicated efforts provide an atmosphere in which religious instruction and religious vocations
are natural and proper parts of life in such schools. Indeed, as
the District Court found, the role of teaching nuns in enhancing
the religious atmosphere has led the parochial school authorities
to attempt to maintain a one-to-one ratio between nuns and lay
teachers in all schools rather than to permit some to be staffed
almost entirely by lay teachers.
On the basis of these findings the District Court concluded
that the parochial schools constituted "an integral part of the
religious mission of the Catholic Church." The various characteristics of the schools make them "a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation." This process
of inculcating religious doctrine is, of course, enhanced by the
impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools particularly. In short, parochial schools involve substantial religious
activity and

The highest church authorities would agree with the Supreme Court's determination that "parochial schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose."aRAttendance of children
a t parochial schools is viewed by the Catholic Church as a religious o b l i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~
In light of these facts and findings, it would appear reasonable to conclude that the detrimental effect on parochial schools
of increasing government expenditures for public education is
87. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U S . 602, 615-16 (1971) (footnote omitted). In Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court made these findings with respect to the nature
of parochial schools:
The very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular
and religious education; the teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to
the inculcation of religious values and belief. . . . Substantial aid to the educational function of such schools, accordingly, necessarily results in aid to the
sectarian school enterprise as a whole. "[Tlhe secular education those schools
provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for
the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably intertwined."
Id. a t 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (opinion of Brennan,
J.)) (citation omitted).
OF VATICAN
II 644-48 (W. Abbott ed. 1966).
88. See THEDOCUMENTS
89. Id. a t 647. Canon law (canon 1374) requires that Catholic students as a rule
THESACRED
CANONS
607-08 (2d rev. ed.
attend Catholic schools. 1 J. ABBOT& J. HANNAN,
1960).
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minor." Therefore, under the principle of economic neutrality,
parochial schools should be allowed to participate in government
educational assistance programs to a limited extent only.
Since the Supreme Court has found the prototype parochial
school to be substantially sectarian, it is appropriate that the
courts take seriously the dangers of sponsorship and entanglement in the context of aid to parochial schools. In this regard,
perhaps the most logical place to draw the line is a t nonideological student-service functions such as health, transportation, and
food services. It is less entangling if government and church officials consult together about buses, nurses, and school lunch than
if there is government regulation of classroom activities. Similarly, the dangers of sponsorship are minimized if government aid
funds only nonideological service functions directed at students
rather than schools.
Systems whereby students would receive a voucher from the
government entitling them to attend the private or public school
of their choice have received much discussion in legal literature?
The fact that vouchers connote no government favoritism for one
kind of school over another and channel aid to students rather
than schools makes them unobjectionable from the standpoint of
sponsorship and administrative entanglement. However, they are
objectionable inasmuch as they allow for complete participation
of sectarian schools in government educational subsidies in contravention of the principle of educational neutral it^.^^
Shared-time programs whereby students attend classes in
90. This conclusion could be erroneous. Although it is true that parochial schools are
experiencing serious financial problems, it is difficult to determine the precise cause or
causes. For an argument that falling enrollments at parochial schools are more the result
of ideological conflicts within the Catholic Church than rising tuition costs, see Boles, The
Burger Court & Parochial Schools: A Study in Law, Politics & Educational Reality, 9 VAL.
U.L. REV.459, 476-77 (1975). More sociological research into the question would be helpful.
91. See, e.g., Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan:
Can a Comtitutional System be Devised?, 72 MICH.L. REV.895 (1974); Comment, The
l k e of Public Funds by Private Schools via Educational Vouchers: Some Constitutional
Problems, 3 PAC.L.J. 90 (1972); Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon Tree,
24 STAN.
L. REV.687 (1972).
92. Although a full voucher system would be violative of the principle of educational
neutrality, a partial voucher system with strict limits placed on the amount of subsidy
permitted to flow to the parents of parochial schoolchildren might be permissible. For
example, an enactment allowing the parents of all schoolchildren to take a deduction from
gross income in calculating their state income tax equal to their expenditures for educational purposes might be permitted by the principle of educational neutrality. Such an
enactment was approved in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316
(D. Minn. 1978).
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both public and parochial schools have also been d i s c u s ~ e dAl.~~
though these programs may enable parochial schools to maintain
higher enrollments than would otherwise be possible, this result
is attained only at the sacrifice of total control over the educational development of participating students. Because of this, it
is very difficult to assess whether shared-time programs in reality
constitute a benefit to religion. Therefore, it would seem harsh to
disallow shared-time programs as violative of the value of neutrality.
Since public and parochial school officials are required to
correlate their efforts, there are certain administrative entanglement problems inherent in shared-time arrangements. Such correlation would not likely engender the kind of government regulation of parochial education that is inherent in direct aid programs, however, because public and parochial school officials
would meet as equals to work out solutions to mutual problems.
Therefore, if government regulation, rather than mere interaction
between public and parochial school officials, is viewed as the
primary evil of administrative entanglement, shared-time programs should not be disallowed on this basis.
Under the alternative rationale, the Supreme Court cases in
the parochial school context do not fare too badly. Except in
limited circumstances the Court has disallowed parochial school
participation in government programs that increase public education expenditures. This conforms with the principle of educational neutrality. Aid has been restricted, for the most part, to
nonideological student-service functions, minimizing the dangers
of sponsorship and administrative entanglement." Certain
shared-time programs have been approved," and voucher-type
-

-

-

93. See, e.g., Rabinove, Does "Dual Enrollment" Violate the First Amendment?, 3
J .L. & EDUC.129 (1974); Comment, Shared-Time-Permissible Aid to Sectarian
Education, 17 DE PAULL. REV.373 (1968).
94. The Court has, however, upheld government programs providing free secular
textbook loans to parochial schoolchildren. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
Such programs entail government evaluation of the textbooks used in parochial schools
and hence a degree of control over the ideological content of classroom activity. In reality,
however, the control over classroom activity exercised as a result of these programs is
probably slight. The entanglement and sponsorship problems created therefore are probably not serious.
95. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,244-48 (1977), the Court approved a sharedtime program whereby parochial students received therapeutic, guidance, and remedial
services in the public schools, in public centers, or in mobile units located apart from
parochial school premises. However, government programs providing secular education to
parochial students on parochial school premises have been disallowed by the district
courts, mainly on the grounds of excessive entanglement. See Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Board of Educ., 369 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (program
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programs have been d i s a l l ~ w e d . ~ ~

B. Aid to Sectarian Colleges
The Supreme Court has divided the world of church-related
higher education into two camps, sectarian colleges and pervasively sectarian .colleges. This Subsection will discuss aid to sectarian colleges, and Subsection C will deal with aid to pervasively
sectarian colleges.
The prototype sectarian college is described and contrasted
with the typical parochial school in this passage from Tilton u.
Richardson:
There are generally significant differences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning
and parochial elementary and secondary schools. The
"affirmative if not dominant policy" of the instruction in precollege church schools is "to assure future adherents to a particular faith by having control of their total education a t an early
age." . . . There is substance to the contention that college
students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination. . . . Furthermore, by their very nature, college
and postgraduate courses tend to limit the opportunities for
sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines.
Many church-related colleges and universities are characterized
by a high degree of academic freedom and seek to evoke free and
critical responses from their students.
. . . In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant higher educational mission is to provide their students with a secular education.
-

-

whereby school district leased rooms in a parochial school and provided teachers for the
instruction of parochial schoolchildren in secular subjects held unconstitutional because
of excessive entanglement and also because the court found that the program had the
primary effect of advancing religion); Americans United for Separation of Church & State
v. Paire, 359 F. Supp. 505 (D.N.H. 1973) (program whereby school district leased rooms
in parochial school and provided teachers for the instruction of parochial schoolchildren
in secular subjects disallowed on grounds of excessive entanglement); Americans United
for Separation of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp. 545 (D. Vt. 1972) (program
providing public teachers and educational materials for the teaching of secular subjects
in parochial schools disallowed on grounds of excessive entanglement).
96. The Supreme Court has never considered a full voucher system for elementary
and secondary schools like the one described in the text. However, the Court in Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), disallowed two
voucher-like programs, a tuition reimbursement program and a tax benefit program, that
suffered from the same defect as full voucher systems: they had the potential for expanding into complete subsidies of parochial education, in violation of the principle of educational neutrality. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
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Since religious indoctrinaction is not a substantial purpose
or activity of these church-related colleges and universities,
there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools
that religion will permeate the area of secular edu~ation.~'

The typical sectarian college, according to this description, is an
island of sectarianism encircling the divinity school awash in a
sea of secular education. This characterization probably fits most
church-related colleges. Although a degree of sectarianism undoubtedly pervades the atmosphere a t the typical sectarian college, its influence is weak in most parts of the institution. Religion, therefore, likely does not play a major role in the decisions
of students to attend such colleges-with the exception, of course,
of ministerial students. As a result, sectarian colleges are highly
vulnerable to government programs that increase expenditures
for public higher education; accordingly, few restrictions should
be placed on their participation in such programs. Complete participation should not be allowed, however, because this would
presumably cause an improvement in the status of such institutions, in violation of the principle of educational neutrality.
Sponsorship and administrative entanglement concerns dictate that direct government aid be prohibited from touching the
small enclaves of concentrated religiosity remaining in sectarian
colleges. In other areas, government aid and government regulation are probably acceptable, since the degree of sectarian influence is slight.
Scholarship and student grant programs are particularly
appropriate vehicles for aiding sectarian colleges. Sponsorship
and administrative entanglement dangers, which are not serious
because of the nature of the aided institutions in any event, would
be further minimized by such an approach.gR
97. 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971) (plurality opinion) (citations and footnotes omitted).
98. Scholarship and similar programs that aid students attending sectarian (as opposed to pervasively sectarian) colleges have generally been upheld in the lower courts.
For a synopsis of a number of the cases, see note 46 supra.
There has been some debate as to whether sectarian colleges receiving tuition from
students aided by government programs should be required to segregate these funds in
special accounts to be used for secular purposes only. See Smith v. Board of Governors,
429 F. Supp. 871, 878-79 (W.D.N.C.) (special accounts not required), aff'd, 434 U.S. 803
(1977); Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. Dunn, 384 F. Supp.
714, 721 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (use of funds received by participating colleges should be
restricted to secular activities), vacated and remanded sub nom. Blanton v. Americans
United for the Separation of Church & State, 421 U.S. 958 (1975). It seem doubtful that
the imposition of such restrictions would alter the fiscal affairs of affected colleges other
than to effect a change of internal accounting procedures. And, on balance, such restrictions would probably tend to create rather than prevent administrative entanglement and
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The Supreme Court decisions dealing with aid to sectarian
collegesghre generally unobjectionable. Substantial participationlw in aid programs has been allowed, but direct aid has been
restricted to "secular" aspects.lol This has tended to minimize
sponsorship and administrative entanglement dangers. Furthermore, this restriction probably has the practical effect of limiting
participation of-sectarian colleges in programs subsidizing public
higher education to the extent necessary to ensure compliance
with the principle of educational neutrality.

C. Aid to Pervasively Sectarian Colleges
The Supreme Court has intimated that all colleges which do
not substantially conform with the sectarian college model set
forth in the previous section will be termed pervasively sectarian.lo2Some statements of the Court can be taken as indicating
that pervasively sectarian institutions should be denied all government aid.lo3This result is correct in the case of pervasively
sectarian colleges that are primarily Bible schools or religious
seminaries, since these institutions would be essentially unaffected by increasing government expenditures for public education. This result seems too harsh, however, in the case of pervasively sectarian institutions that are not Bible schools or religious
seminaries. Although these colleges are generally not as vulnerable to increasing funding of public education as their less sectarian counterparts, they are undoubtedly affected, and under the
principle of educational neutrality should be allowed some participation in aid programs.
sponsorship. Therefore, they should not be imposed. See Smith v. Board of Governors,
429 F. Supp. a t 879.
99. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
100. In two of the three Supreme Court cases dealing with government aid to sectarian colleges, the programs that were approved aided both public and nonpublic institutions equally. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 676-77 (1971) (plurality opinion). The program approved in the third case aided only
nonpublic colleges. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976) (plurality
opinion). I t could be argued, however, that this enactment was an attempt by the state
legislature to neutralize in one program the ill effects suffered by sectarian and other
nonpublic colleges due to a series of fairly contemporaneous enactments aiding only public
colleges.
101. Since a certain degree of religious influence probably pervades the atmostphere
a t most sectarian colleges, it would be more accurate to say that direct aid has been
prohibited from touching the small enclaves of concentrated religiosity remaining in these
institutions.
102. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976) (plurality
opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973).
103. E.g.,Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
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In a footnote to his majority opinion in Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, Mr. Justice Powell
suggested that participation in scholarship or grant programs
available to all students attending both public and private colleges may be an appropriate vehicle for aiding pervasively sectarian colleges.lo4
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly
religious character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a case involving some form of public
assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally without
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted. . . . Thus, our decision today
does not compel, as appellees have contended, the concluson
that the educational assistance provisions of the "G. I. Bill,"
. . . impermissibly advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. lo"

The dangers of sponsorship and administrative entanglement posed by such programs are substantially reduced, since aid
is directed to students instead of to schools. Moreover, restricting
aid to participation in general scholarship and grant programs
probably has the practical effect of limiting the net assistance to
these colleges to levels permissible under the principle of educational neutrality .Io6

Government aid to church-related education poses an extremely difficult constitutional question. The Supreme Court, in
the words of Mr. Justice Powell, has "sought to establish principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the Establishment
Clause without resort to blind absolutism."107The Court decisions
104. Presumably, Justice Powell would not have extended these benefits to Bible
school or religious seminary students.
There is a conflict of authority among the lower courts as to whether students attending pervasively sectarian colleges may be permitted to participate in general scholarship
or grant programs. See note 46 supra. However, the Supreme Court recently affirmed a
general assistance program available to pervasively sectarian college students. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State v. Blanton, 434 U S . 803, aff'g 433 F. Supp. 97
(M.D.
Tenn. 1977).
105. 413 U S . 756, 782 n.38 (1973) (citations omitted).
106. Aid to students attending pervasively sectarian colleges should probably be
restricted to participation in programs that truly aid all college students. Participation of
these students in programs providing major assistance to nonpublic college students but
only token assistance to public college students is probably objectionable.
107. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U S . 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
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have been generally successful in avoiding "blind absolutism,"
but the principles that have been established have been unclear
and difficult to justify.
This Comment has proposed an alternative rationale which
is believed to be more satisfactory. A principle of educational
neutrality has been defined that resolves the paradox of simultaneous Court adherence to the value of neutrality and approval of
programs that in fact channel government aid to church-related
education. This principle, together with the principle of sponsorship neutrality and the values of avoidance of political and administrative entanglement, serves in large part to justify prior
Court decisions and provides a framework within which future
decisions can be made.

Randolph G . Muhlestein

